

















Firms can improve their stock liquidity and lower their costs of capital through seasoned 
equity offerings (SEO). This paper examines whether SEO firms achieve a liquidity 
gain and the sources of this gain. It explores the role of liquidity risk in explaining SEO 
long-run performance. The evidence shows that SEO firms experience significant post-
issue improvements in liquidity and reductions in liquidity risk. Size and book-to-
market matching fails to control for these liquidity effects, generating the low long-term 
post-SEO performance documented in the literature. After adjusting for liquidity risk, 
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Firms care about their stock liquidity because it affects their costs of capital through 
the premium investors require for holding illiquid or high liquidity-risk stocks.
1
 A seasoned 
equity offering (SEO) can improve liquidity by shifting the firm’s shareholder base towards 
more active traders and by increasing market visibility, where the latter can stimulate trading 
by lowering the adverse selection costs of trading with a better informed counterparty. Eckbo, 
Masulis and Norli (2007) confirm that managers consider liquidity improvements when 
issuing equity.
2
   
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, we investigate whether SEO firms 
improve their stock liquidity post-issue and where liquidity gains come from. In particular, 
we examine institutional investor share ownership and analyst coverage, the two factors that 
previous studies associate with lower adverse selection costs of trading and more frequent 
trading (Falkenstein, 1996; Irvine, 2003; Roulstone, 2003; Rubin, 2007; Agarwal, 2007).  
Second, we examine whether liquidity gains and reduced post-SEO liquidity risk explain low 
long-run post-SEO stock performance.  
We examine four measures of liquidity to capture its multiple dimensions. The first 
two are Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs, which captures 
effective spread, and Amihud’s (2002) return to volume ratio, which measures the price 
impact of trade. Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) show that these two liquidity proxies 
relate closely to realized trade cost and price impact measures estimated from high frequency 
TAQ and Rule 605 data. The other two measures are stock turnover, which captures the 
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 A growing literature shows that expected returns are positively related to illiquidity or liquidity risk (e.g., 
Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; 
Sadka, 2006; Liu, 2006). 
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 As a real-life example, New Oriental Education and Technology Group Inc (NYSE:EDU) justified a new 
equity issue as follows, “New Oriental Education and Technology Group Inc could embark on a secondary share 
issue valued at more than 100 mln USD next year to add liquidity to trading in its stock, chief financial officer 
Louis Hsieh said. The investment banks are asking us to float more shares, so that would be the most likely 
outcome, he said. Such an issue would help trading volume as well as allow long-term shareholders and venture 





ability to trade large quantities of stock, and Liu’s (2006) illiquidity measure, which captures 
multidimensional aspects of liquidity, with an emphasis on trading speed.  
We show that SEO firms experience significant improvements in post-issue liquidity. 
Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimate falls by 24% over the five years after the issue compared 
with the five years pre-issue. Liu’s (2006) trading discontinuity measure shows a 69% 
liquidity gain over the same period. Similar comparisons using stock turnover and Amihud’s 
(2002) return to volume ratio indicate liquidity gains of 70% and 56%. We find that SEO 
firms have significantly higher post-issue liquidity characteristics than size and book-to-
market (B/M) matched firms, indicating that size–B/M matching fails to control for SEO 
firms’ liquidity gains.    
Examining the sources of post-issue liquidity improvements, SEO firms experience a 
22% increase in analyst following over the five years after the issue compared with the five 
years pre-issue. A higher analyst following improves the amount and quality of information 
about the firm, lowering the adverse selection costs of trading and increasing market liquidity 
(Irvine 2003; Roulstone, 2003). The number of institutional investors holding SEO firm stock 
increases by 39% on average, and their stake increases by 31%. This suggests that SEOs 
attract institutional investors, who become more dominant after the offering. Increased 
institutional trading and greater competition between sophisticated investors reduce the 
adverse selection costs of trading with a better informed party and can explain SEO liquidity 
gains (Falkenstein, 1996; Rubin, 2007; Agarwal, 2007). We also find that increases in analyst 
following and institutional investor holdings are larger for Nasdaq than NYSE/AMEX stocks, 
coinciding with the higher liquidity gains for Nasdaq listed SEOs. Regression analysis 
confirms that the higher post-issue liquidity of SEO firms is related to changes in analyst 




Consistent with past evidence, SEOs experience negative buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns relative to size–B/M matched stocks, and negative alphas in Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model (FF3FM) regressions. Post-issue calendar time regressions show that SEO 
firms load negatively on the liquidity factor of a liquidity-augmented CAPM (LCAPM), with 
liquidity betas of 0.096 using equal weighting (EW) and 0.066 using value weighting 
(VW). Given an average monthly liquidity premium over 1970–2009 of 0.615%, these 
negative loadings lower post-issue SEO expected returns by 0.059% (EW) and 0.041% (VW) 
per month. The LCAPM alpha with respect to the FF3FM increases to −0.03% from −0.246% 
per month using EW and to −0.098% from −0.344% per month using VW. This means that 
after adjusting for liquidity risk, SEO firms show normal long-term performance. Our 
conclusions remain when we estimate LCAPM regressions for individual SEOs.  
A series of robustness checks confirms the liquidity risk explanation of low long-run 
post-SEO performance. These include examining SEOs by industry, firm age, type of equity 
issued, hot and cold issue periods, SEO portfolios formed 3- and 6-months after the issue, 
which allows us to contrast short- and long-term post-issue liquidity gains, and SEOs where 
the post-issue period includes the liquidity drought during the recent financial crisis. Further 
analysis shows that size–B/M matched stocks have higher liquidity risk than SEO firms, 
which explains the significant negative long-run abnormal returns to SEO firms when using 
these as benchmark stocks. Matching on liquidity after the issue equates SEO and matched 
stock performance. 
This study is not the first to examine the explanatory power of liquidity risk for the 
long-run performance of SEO firms. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000), Eckbo and Norli 
(2005) and Eckbo et al. (2007) also investigate the relation between liquidity and SEO 
performance. Eckbo et al. (2000) show that SEO stock turnover improves after the issue. 




explains long-term post-IPO performance and, in a robustness test, that this model explains 
long-term post-SEO returns. Eckbo et al. (2007) report no abnormal performance, using the 
same model, for industrial, financial, and utility SEOs. This study differs from and 
complements these earlier studies by providing a detailed and comprehensive description of 
the liquidity evolution of SEO firms.  
First, to capture the multiple dimensions of liquidity, we use four measures to 
describe SEO liquidity characteristics before and after the issue, and provide a detailed 
analysis of SEO liquidity dynamics. Second, we show that post-issue liquidity gains are 
attributable to a reduction in information asymmetry and improved share trading, as analyst 
coverage of SEO stocks and institutional stock ownership both increase. Third, we show that 
SEOs experience significant decreases in liquidity risk exposure. Existing studies largely 
ignore pre- to post-issue changes in liquidity.
3
 Fourth, we use a liquidity risk factor based on 
trading discontinuity that captures multiple dimensions of liquidity. In contrast, Eckbo and 
Norli’s (2005) liquidity risk factor is based on stock turnover. But Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) find that high-turnover stocks tend to be small stocks, which questions turnover as a 
liquidity measure, while Liu (2010) reports an insignificant pre-1963 premium associated 
with stock turnover. Using all CRSP stocks, we show that the LCAPM describes the cross-
section of stock returns based on liquidity sorts over the period 1970–2009, whereas the 
FF3FM and the FF3FM augmented by a turnover-based factor do not. Fifth, Eckbo and Norli 
(2005) and Eckbo et al. (2007) include a momentum factor in their analysis, which the 
literature commonly associates with less-than-rational investor behavior, so their analysis 
cannot rule out a behavioral explanation of SEO returns. In contrast, our results provide clear 
and comprehensive evidence of a liquidity-based discount rate explanation of post-SEO 
returns.  
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The paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the distribution of 
new equity issues over the sample period. Section 3 confirms previous findings of low SEO 
performance using five-year buy-and-hold returns. Section 4 reports the liquidity 
characteristics of SEO firms before and after the offering, and compared to size–B/M 
matched stocks. It also explores the relation between post-issue liquidity changes and analyst 
following and institutional share ownership. Section 5 analyzes SEO performance in calendar 
and event time. Section 6 presents robustness tests and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Data and sample selection criteria 
Our sample of seasoned equity offerings is from the SDC New Issues database. The 
sample period starts in January 1970 and ends in December 2009. To allow for a five-year 
holding period, the last offering is in December 2004. The sample includes all US domiciled 
companies listed on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq that make SEOs of pure primary shares or 
combinations of primary and equity sales by a major shareholder (combinations) in the US 
market. We include industrial, financial, and utility firms but exclude unit offerings and SEOs 
that simultaneously offer debt, preferred stock, or warrants. The sample also excludes private 
placements, exchange offers of stock, 144A offers, cancelled offers, and spin-off related 
issues. These criteria lead to an initial sample of 9,928 issues. From this we exclude equity 
offerings by the same company occurring during the (five-year) holding period of a previous 
equity offering, leaving a sample of 6,986 SEOs. This is because Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
(1999) report severe cross-sectional correlation and misspecified tests when event windows 
for the same company overlap. Retaining offerings of common stock only (CRSP share codes 
10 and 11) with return data available for at least a month after the issue leaves 6,425 SEOs. 
Data requirements on market and book values of common equity from the Compustat/CRSP 




our main sample.      
 Table 1 describes the sample distribution stratified by exchange, broad industry group 
(financial, industry, and utility), type of equity issue (pure sales of primary shares and offers 
accompanied by sales of equity by a major shareholder), membership of nine Fama and 
French (1993) size–B/M portfolios, issue period, and whether the issue takes place in a hot or 
cold issue period.
4
 Of the 4,446 SEOs, 1,995 are on NYSE/AMEX and 2,451 are on Nasdaq. 
Industrial firms form the largest new equity issue group with 3,447 SEOs, compared to 482 
utility and 517 financial SEOs. Using NYSE breakpoints to split issuers into three portfolios, 
small (S), medium (Me), and big (B) by market value of common equity and three portfolios, 
high (H), medium (M), and low (L) by B/M, gives 2,433 small compared to 665 large 
capitalization stocks and 2,011 low B/M stocks, of which 1,204 are small. This coincides 
with previous findings that small, low B/M stocks dominate new equity issuers. The number 
of new equity issues increases over time with 1,809 SEOs in the 1990s. Almost two-thirds of 
the sample (3,042) occur in hot issue periods with over 56% listed on Nasdaq.    
 
3. The long-run performance of SEOs: event time analysis 
Previous studies of post-SEO long-run performance in event time report buy-and-hold 
returns that are significantly lower, both statistically and economically, than size–B/M 
matched stocks. To confirm these findings for our sample, we match based on the closest 
neighbor approach, following Loughran and Ritter (1995). We pair each issuer with non-
issuing firms in a 30% bracket of the issuer’s equity value at the year-end before the offering, 
where non-issuers are firms that have not issued equity in the past five years. From this pool 
we select a control firm with the closest B/M to the issuer’s. To avoid hindsight bias we use 
book value of equity for the fiscal year two years earlier if an issue takes place in the first six 
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 We define an issue month as hot (cold) if the number of SEOs in the month before the issue is above (below) 





months of a year and book value from the previous fiscal year for issues in the second six 
months of the year. The definition of B/M follows Fama and French (1992).
5
 We include the 
control for a 5-year holding period and allow each control to pair with one SEO over the 
holding period. Pairing each control with one SEO over the holding period reduces problems 
of cross-sectional correlation. If a match delists or issues equity, we choose a new match 
from the original list of eligible benchmarks. We truncate the SEO and its match return on the 





i iBHR R         (1) 
where iR is firm i’s stock return in month  . The holding period starts at the beginning of 
the month following the issue and ends at the earlier of the five-year anniversary or the 
delisting date. To avoid a delisting bias, we follow Shumway (1997) and Shumway and 
Warther (1999) and include delisting returns. When a delisting return is missing, we assume a 
return of −1 for delisting due to liquidation (CRSP codes 400–490), −0.33 for performance 
related delisting (CRSP codes 500 and 520–584), and zero otherwise. The average holding 






 , where ix  denotes EW or VW. 
Value weights are based on market value one month before the offer, scaled by the value-
weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq CRSP stock market index to give comparability over time.    
Table 2 reports average BHRs for issuers and matches over a five-year holding 
period; Diff, denoting the difference, gives issuers’ percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs). Average BHAR is −27.67% using EW and −26.10% using VW. With EW, 
NYSE/AMEX issuers have less underperformance than Nasdaq stocks (−23.43% vs. 
−31.12%) and similar levels of underperformance using VW (−26.23% vs. −25.26%). 
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 Book value is the Compustat book value of stockholders’ equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credits less the book value of preferred stock. The value of preferred stock is the redemption, 
liquidation, or par value, in that order depending on availability. Market value of equity is the number of shares 





Skewness-adjusted t-statistics recommended by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) show 
significant SEO underperformance in all specifications at 5%. 
Test statistics can be negatively biased due to cross-sectionally correlated abnormal 
returns. Jegadeesh and Karceski (2009) propose a correlation and heteroskedasticity 
consistent test that adjusts for cross-sectional correlation. Their test statistic takes the form 
' ( ) 't w AR H w Vw , where w is a vector of weights,
6
 )(HAR is the H-month holding period 
(60 months in this study) average abnormal return of each monthly cohort of securities 
experiencing an event in month t and V is the TT variance–covariance matrix of )(HAR , 
where T is the number of monthly cohorts. Overlapping returns lead to non-zero serial 
covariances between observations closer than H months apart; all higher order covariances 
are set to zero. Estimates of V are based on a generalized version of White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent variance estimator. The penultimate column of Table 2 reports 
the Jegadeesh-Karceski t-test, which decreases the magnitude of test statistics on average by 
over 76 percent. For example, the t-statistic moves from −8.345 to −1.801 for the pooled 
sample using EW. Despite lower t-values, however, abnormal returns remain significant at 
10%, with the one exception of Nasdaq returns using VW, which are insignificant. We 
conclude that both economically and statistically the SEO puzzle is evident in our sample.  
 
4. The evolution of SEO liquidity characteristics 
Numerous studies find a negative relation between stock liquidity and expected return 
(e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Brennan et al., 
1998; Amihud 2002). Chordia et al. (2000), Lo and Wang (2000), and Hasbrouck and Seppi 
(2001) find commonalities in liquidity in the cross-section of stocks. Pastor and Stambaugh 
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 For EW, the i
th
 element is the ratio of the number of events in month t to the total sample size; for VW, the i
th
 





(2003), Sadka (2006), and Liu (2006) show that market liquidity is a relevant state variable 
for asset pricing. This section explores the liquidity evolution of SEO firms. 
In their horserace of effective spread and price impact proxies, Goyenko et al. (2009, 
167) find that “measures intended to capture other features of transaction costs, Amihud, 
Pastor and Stambaugh, and Amivest, do a poor job estimating effective and realized spreads”, 
which illustrates the need to use multiple measures to capture different liquidity dimensions. 
We use four liquidity measures, each emphasizing different liquidity dimensions. This offers 
a more complete description of the evolution of SEO liquidity.  
  The first measure is Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs, 
c, based on Roll (1984). Hasbrouck’s (2009) horserace of four effective transaction cost 
measures shows that c clearly dominates and, among twelve spread proxies, Goyenko et al. 
(2009, Table 3) find that c has the highest annual cross-sectional correlations with effective 
and realized spreads calculated from TAQ data. We obtain data on c from Joel Hasbrouck’s 
website.  
The second liquidity measure is share turnover (TR), which represents the trading 
quantity dimension of liquidity. TR is the daily number of shares traded (volume) as a 
percentage of the number of shares outstanding on the day (shares out), averaged over the  








        (2) 
To calculate TR, a stock must have daily trading volume data available over the prior 12 
months. Datar et al. (1998) report a close link between TR and bid-ask spread. Brennan et al. 
(1998) and Datar et al. (1998) show a negative cross-sectional relation between TR and 
expected returns.  
The third (il)liquidity measure is Liu’s (2006) LM12, defined as the standardized 
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 ,     (3) 
where TR12 is the sum of daily turnovers (in percentage) over the prior 12 months, Deflator 
= 20,000 to ensure that  1 12 1TR Deflator  , and NoTD is the number of exchange trading 
days over the prior 12 months; the final term standardizes the number of trading days in a 
month to 21. Calculating LM12 requires daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months. 
LM12 captures multiple features of liquidity such as trading quantity, trading costs, and 
trading continuity, with particular emphasis on the latter, which is the major generator of the 
liquidity premium.  
The final (il)liquidity measure is Amihud’s (2002) return to volume metric, denoted 
RtoV, which measures the price impact of trade. Among different price impact proxies, 
Goyenko et al. (2009) report that RtoV is generally the best candidate. RtoV is the daily ratio 
of absolute daily return, R, to the dollar denominated trading volume on the day, volume $, 











  .      (4) 
Constructing RtoV requires at least an 80% availability of daily trading volumes in the prior 
12 months,
7
 and excludes zero trading volume days. 
Analyzing liquidity characteristics requires each SEO and control stock to have at 
least one month with non-missing liquidity characteristics over both the 5-year pre- and post-
issue periods. This reduces the sample to 3,587 issues but ensures a consistent comparison of 
pre- and post-offering liquidity characteristics. We examine all four liquidity measures from 
January 1965 to December 2009.
8
 The sample reduction (from 4,446 to 3,587) is due to more 
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 Amihud (2002) requires at least 200 daily trading volumes in the prior 12 months. 
8
 Hasbrouck (2009) estimates c at the year-end using daily price data over the prior 12 months. We use this 










4.1 The evolution of SEO and benchmark stock liquidity around equity issues 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the four liquidity measures during the five years 
before and after the issue for SEO firms and their size–B/M matches. In Figure 1a, the cost of 
trading SEO stocks, c ( 210 ), increases from 0.82 five years before to 1.063 ten months 
before the issue. It decreases in the period leading up to an issue, reaching 0.967 one month 
before. This coincides with the period when the company is planning the issue. Trading costs 
continue to drift down following the issue, from 0.918 one month after to 0.694 eighteen 
months after, leveling out at 0.723 over the subsequent period. Matching stocks experience 
no improvements in trading costs with a mean c of 0.877 before and 0.925 after the issue. 
Figure 1b shows a gradual increase in average daily turnover rates. Daily turnover 
increases from 0.29% five years before to 0.384% twelve months before the issue. TR jumps 
to 0.524% one month before the issue and continues to increase after the issue, from 0.628% 
one month after to a peak of 0.744% in the eleventh month after. Average TR decreases to 
0.616% two years after the issue and levels out at around 0.61% over the remaining period. 
Size–B/M control stocks exhibit little change in TR with average TR increasing from 0.333% 
pre-issue to 0.456% post-issue. Figure 1c shows a similar picture for LM12. LM12 falls 
sharply in the year before the issue, from 8.021 twelve months before to 5.757 one month 
before, a fall of 28.2 percent, and decreases further around the issue (from 5.757 one month 
before to 4.802 one month after, a fall of 16.6 percent). Liquidity continues to improve over 
the next eleven months, with an average LM12 gain of 66.8 percent (from 4.802 one month 
after the issue to 1.597 twelve months after) and levels out around an average of 2.065 over 
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 Footnote 10 below summarises the results of an analysis of the possible effects of this sample reduction, which 





the remaining period. Mean LM12 for matching stocks is 8.412 in the 60 months before the 
issue and 7.855 in the five-years after.  
Figure 1d shows that RtoV ( 610  from now on) is relatively flat until month 12 
before the issue. But it decreases from 2.208 twelve months before the issue to 1.335 one 
month before. It continues to fall during the twelve months after the issue (from 0.935 one 
month after to 0.505 twelve months after) and levels out at an average 0.884 over the 
remaining period with a slight spike in months 38 to 42 after the issue. Control stocks have an 
average RtoV of 1.375 pre-issue, drifting upwards to an average of 2.008 post-issue. 
Table 3, Panel A shows the mean liquidity characteristics of SEOs, size–B/M 
matches, and their differences for the 5-year pre-issue period. SEOs have significantly higher 
trading costs than benchmark stocks pre-issue with a mean c difference between SEOs and 
control stocks of 0.065. SEOs have lower LM12 and higher TR (mean differences between 
SEOs and control stocks of −1.413 and 0.029%) and higher RtoV (mean difference of 0.465). 
Mean differences in liquidity between SEOs and control stocks are highly significant, which 
suggests that size–B/M matching fails to match on liquidity.  
Table 3, Panel B shows the mean liquidity characteristics of SEOs and their size–B/M 
matches over the 5-year post-issue period. We make two observations. First, SEO liquidity 
improves relative to benchmark stocks. SEO trading costs fall and the average difference in c 
between SEOs and size–B/M matches falls to −0.191. The mean differences in LM12 and TR 
increase in magnitude to −5.653 and 0.182%, 4 and 6.3 times the magnitudes in Panel A. The 
difference in RtoV becomes negative, decreasing from 0.465 in Panel A to −1.153 in Panel B. 
Second, the increased liquidity mismatch post-issue is due to higher SEO liquidity. Issuers’ 
trading costs fall from 0.962 in Panel A to 0.736 in Panel B, a 23.51% decrease. LM12 falls 
from 7.075 in Panel A to 2.228 in Panel B, a 68.51% decrease, and turnover improves from 




volume, which falls from 1.857 to 0.821, a 55.79% reduction. Nasdaq listed issuers 
experience the biggest liquidity gains post-issue with c falling from 1.595 to 0.984, LM12 
falling from 12.69 to 3.034, TR increasing from 0.592% to 0.923%, and RtoV falling from 
3.378 to 1.049. The results in Table 3 clearly reveal that SEOs improve their liquidity 
following the offering and that size–B/M matching does not control for SEO liquidity 
characteristics. 
 
4.2 SEO return performance relative to liquidity matched control stocks 
Our results suggest that the high liquidity of SEO stocks may explain their low 
performance relative to size–B/M matched stocks. We therefore test whether liquidity 
matching after the issue equates SEO and control firm returns. Table 4 reports SEO buy-and-
hold abnormal returns relative to size–B/M matches and post-issue LM12-matched control 
firms. We match on LM12 in months 8, 12, and 18 after the offering to control for the gradual 
improvement in SEO liquidity evident in Figure 1. Missing liquidity characteristics in the 
matching month lead to slight sample reductions. Issuing stocks underperform size–B/M 
control stocks based on skewness adjusted t-statistics and Jegadeesh and Karceski’s (2009) t-
test over all three holding periods (at 5%) for all portfolios using EW and the majority of 
portfolios using VW. LM12 matching reduces the BHARs using EW from −35.75% to 
−17.97% for the match made in month eight, from −28.3% to −13.25% for the match made in 
month twelve, and from −19.26% to −8.25% for the match made in month eighteen. 
Corresponding increases in BHARs using VW are from −22.35% to −13.93%, from −17.7% 
to −10.89%, and from −10.63% to 0.67%. Based on skewness adjusted t-statistics and 




benchmarks over any of the holding periods.
10
 Matching on c, TR, or RtoV also shows less 
SEO underperformance than size–B/M matching.  
 
4.3 What explains SEO liquidity gains after the issue? 
We explore two explanations for increases in SEO liquidity after the offering.  First, 
an equity offering is likely to increase analyst coverage. Previous studies show that issuing 
firms actively seek analyst coverage after the issue and analyst coverage can form part of the 
underwriting agreement (Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 2001; Cliff and Denis, 2004). Higher 
analyst following increases market visibility and improves the amount and quality of 
information about the firm available to investors (Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Barron et al. 2002; 
Francis, et al. 2002). This in turn reduces information asymmetry and the cost of trading with 
better informed investors, leading to higher price informativeness and stock liquidity 
(Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Irvine, 2003; Roulstone, 
2003; Barth and Hutton, 2004; Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2006).  
Second, previous studies report a positive relation between institutional shareholding 
and stock liquidity (Falkenstein, 1996; Rubin, 2007; Agarwal, 2007). This is because (1) 
institutional investors trade more often and trade larger share volumes, and (2) an increased 
presence of institutional investors increases competition among investors, improving market 
efficiency and reducing the likelihood of trading against a better informed counterparty.  
To test these two propositions, we examine changes in analyst following and in 
institutional holdings for five years before and after the issue for SEOs and size–B/M 
matches. We calculate the number of analysts following a firm, #Anal, as the number of 
analysts providing earnings forecasts for a firm, over all possible forecast horizons, in the 
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 To check that our analysis of liquidity dynamics on a reduced sample is representative of the full sample, we 
conduct two additional analyses. First, we examine BHARs for the 3,587 SEOs. Untabulated results show no 
significant differences from results for the full sample in Table 2. Second, we replicate the calendar time 
analysis of Section 5 below for the 3,587 SEOs to investigate their liquidity risk dynamics after the issue. The 





past 12 months including the current month. The calculation of #Anal is based on the IBES 
detail files. We exclude stocks not covered by IBES and assume analyst coverage is zero if a 
stock is listed on IBES but has no analyst following in the past 12 months including the 
current month.  
Institutional holdings data are from the Thomson Reuters 13F Holdings database 
(formerly the CDA/Spectrum database). The Securities and Exchange Commission requires 
institutions that manage equity in excess of $100 million to file (quarterly) form 13F, listing 
holdings larger than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. At the quarter-end, we 
calculate the total number of institutions holding shares in a firm, #Inst, and the total number 
of shares they hold. To find the proportion of shares held by institutions, %SharesInst, we 
scale total institutional shareholdings by the number of shares outstanding from CRSP at the 





4.3.1 The evolution of analyst following and institutional investor holdings around SEOs 
Figure 2 examines the evolution of analyst following and institutional investor 
shareholdings for SEO firms and their size–B/M matches for five years before and after the 
issue. Subsequently, Table 5 reports the mean analyst following and institutional holdings of 
SEOs, size–B/M matches, and tests their differences around the offering. The next section 
presents results of a regression analysis testing whether changes in analyst following and 
institutional investor holdings explain post-issue liquidity gains of SEO stocks. 
Figure 2a shows a pre-issue decline in analyst coverage, with the average number of 
analysts covering SEO stocks decreasing from 9.27 five years before the issue to 7.65 six 
months before the issue. However, #Anal increases sharply from this latter value to 10 sixteen 
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months after the issue, a 30.7% increase. Analyst coverage levels out at 10.44 over the 
remaining period. Analyst coverage of benchmark stocks decreases from 8.28 over the five-
years before the issue to 7.51 over the five-years after the issue. The results in Figure 2a are 
consistent with our prediction that new equity issues attract increased analyst coverage.  
Figure 2b shows that the number of institutional investors holding SEO stock declines 
before the offering, falling from 85.99 five-years before the issue to 73.16 twelve months 
before the issue. However, similar to analyst following, #Inst increases to 87.28 one month 
before the issue and reaches a peak of 134.88 five-years after the issue. Mean institutional 
holdings of size–B/M matches are 87.78 before the issue and 96.09 after the issue. Figure 2c 
reports the proportion of SEO firm shares held by institutional investors. %SharesInst is 
roughly constant around 40–41% up to twelve months before the issue. Institutional 
ownership increases from 40.1% twelve months before the issue to 53.6% twelve months 
after the issue, a 33.6% increase, and levels off at 55.6% over the remaining period. The 
proportion of shares held by institutional investors in size–B/M matches is 41.8% before the 
issue and 47.8% after the offering. Together, Figures 2b and 2c suggest that share issues 
attract institutional investors, who become the dominant shareholders after the offering. The 
results in Figure 2 are consistent with Gibson et al. (2004), who find an increase in 
institutional holdings in SEO firms in the four quarters after the SEO, and Lin and Wu 
(2010), who also report an increase in SEO institutional holdings and analyst coverage after 
the issue. 
Table 5 shows the mean analyst following and institutional holdings of SEOs, size–
B/M matches, and their differences around the offering. Panel A shows the results for the 5-
year pre-issue period. Compared to size–B/M matches, SEOs have higher analyst following 
before the issue and a greater percentage of institutional ownership. NYSE/AMEX listed 




consistent with Falkenstein’s (1996) findings that institutional investors prefer to hold larger 
and more liquid stocks.  
Table 5, Panel B reports mean analyst coverage and institutional investor holdings of 
SEOs, size–B/M matches, and their differences for the 5-year post-issue period. Analyst 
coverage of SEO stocks increases from 8.288 before the issue to 10.117 after the issue, and 
the difference in analyst coverage of SEOs compared to benchmark stocks increases from 
0.342 to 2.644. Analyst following of benchmark stocks decreases after the issue. The number 
of institutional investors holding SEO stock increases from 79.402 before the issue to 
110.048 after the issue, a 38.6% gain. The percentage of SEO firm shares held by 
institutional investors increases from 42.12% before the issue to 55.17% after the issue, a 
30.99% increase. Benchmark stocks show only a 14.29% increase in institutional holdings. 
The difference in institutional investor ownership of SEOs compared to size–B/M matches 
after the offering increases from 0.62% before the issue to 7.74% after the issue. The increase 
in SEO analyst coverage and institutional holdings compared to benchmark stocks after the 
issue mirrors the SEO liquidity gains compared to size–B/M matches in Table 3. Further, 
Nasdaq issuers experience the largest increase in analyst coverage after the issue (an increase 
of 60.96%) and institutional holdings (#Inst increases by 81.09% and %SharesInst shows a 
44.12% gain), consistent with the higher liquidity gains for Nasdaq listed SEOs in Table 3.  
 
4.3.2 Liquidity gains and changes in analyst following and institutional investor holdings 
around SEOs 
To test formally whether changes in analyst following and institutional investor 
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(5) 
where 
iLiqGain  is the change in one of the four liquidity measures from Table 3 in the 5-year 
post-issue period for SEO firm i. The changes in c, RtoV and LM12 are multiplied by −1 so 
that positive values of LiqGain reflect SEO liquidity increases after the issue. ∆#Anal, 
∆%SharesInst and ∆#Inst are the changes, in percentage, in analyst coverage and institutional 
holdings of SEOs after compared to before the issue, and %NewShares is the proportion of 
(primary and secondary) shares issued relative to the number of shares outstanding one 
month before the offering. The book-to-market ratio is for the fiscal year two years before the 
offering if an issue takes place in the first six months of a year, and for the previous fiscal 
year for issues in the second six months of the year. Market capitalization is measured one 
month before the offering and scaled by the CRSP stock market index to give comparability 
over time. Hot and Nasdaq are indicator variables for hot-issue periods and for SEO listings 
on Nasdaq. We winsorize all variables at the top and bottom 1% of values.   
Table 6 shows the results of estimating model (5). For ease of exposition, the 
coefficients when c is the liquidity measure are multiplied by 10
3
. We find a positive 
association between SEO liquidity gains and changes in analyst following and in the 
(percentage) institutional investor ownership of SEOs (∆%SharesInst) for the majority of the 
liquidity measures. The increase in the number of institutional investors holding SEO stock 
after the offering, ∆#Inst, is positively associated with stock turnover. With the exception of 
stock turnover, larger equity offerings relative to the pre-issue number of shares outstanding 
increase SEO stock liquidity. Value firms and smaller firms have greater liquidity gains. 
Nasdaq listed SEOs experience larger gains with respect to −c and stock turnover. Overall, 
the results in Table 6 show that post-issue SEO liquidity gains are associated with increases 




5. Calendar time analysis  
Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), and 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) challenge the notion that firm characteristics drive expected 
stock returns. A calendar time analysis allows us to examine whether a factor model can 
explain low SEO long-run performance. Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
advocate the calendar time approach as being less susceptible to bad model problems as it 
does not compound spurious abnormal returns. It also poses fewer statistical problems (less 
skewness and kurtosis) and adjusts directly for cross-sectional correlation. The intercept 
(alpha) of a calendar time regression estimates the mean monthly abnormal return.  
We first replicate previous evidence on SEO calendar time performance in FF3FM 
regressions with a five-year holding period. Table 7 reports alphas and factor loadings from 
regressing equal and value weighted SEO portfolio excess returns on the three factors, using 
the main sample of 4,446 SEOs. We require at least 10 stocks in a monthly calendar time 
portfolio to ensure that a few stocks do not unduly influence the parameter estimates and to 
limit heteroskedasticity of the portfolio residual variance.
12
 This restricts the sample period to 
April 1970–December 2009. 
In general, SEO returns covary positively with each of the three factors, although 
Nasdaq SEOs load negatively on HML. The pooled sample alpha is −0.246% using EW and 
−0.344% using VW, and Nasdaq SEOs have more negative alphas than NYSE/AMEX SEOs. 
All alphas using EW are significant at 5% and all alphas using VW are significant at 10%.
13
 
Overall, the Fama and French (1993) model fails to explain low SEO performance.  
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 The average number of stocks in a calendar time portfolio is 501 per month, which on average produces 
homoscedastic standard errors. However, we correct test statistics for heteroskedasticity in Tables 7–13 
whenever White’s (1980) model specification test rejects the null of homoscedasticity.  
13
 The pooled sample alpha is a non-linear combination of the exchange regression alphas and includes the 
diversification effect of pooling stocks across the two exchanges. The pooled sample alpha also adjusts for 
constraining the factor loadings to average values across the exchanges. For example, the higher pooled alpha 






5.1 Tests based on liquidity augmented asset pricing models 
To assess the explanatory power of liquidity risk for post-SEO performance, we 
initially use Liu’s (2006) LCAPM.14 The LCAPM consists of the market factor and a 
liquidity risk factor, LIQ  
( ) ( ) ( )
i f mi m f li
E R R E R R E LIQ          (6) 
Liu (2010) shows that LM12 captures multiple liquidity dimensions and that it generates a 
more robust premium than bid-ask spread, Hasbrouck’s c, the number of zero daily returns, 
stock turnover, and return-to-volume. We construct LIQ based on LM12. Specifically, we 
independently sort NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks at the end of each month based on LM12 
and form two portfolios. One is a low liquidity portfolio, LL, containing the highest LM12 
NYSE/AMEX stocks, based on a 15% NYSE breakpoint, and the 35% highest LM12 Nasdaq 
stocks. The other is a high liquidity portfolio, HL, containing the lowest LM12 NYSE/AMEX 
stocks, based on a 35% NYSE breakpoint, and the 15% lowest LM12 Nasdaq stocks. The two 
portfolios are equally-weighted and held for six months after portfolio formation. The 
liquidity risk factor, LIQ, is constructed as the monthly profits from buying one dollar of LL 
and selling one dollar of HL. Model (6) excludes SMB and HML because distress risk proxied 
by these two factors is a source of stock illiquidity. Thus, liquidity risk should capture 
distress risk more directly. Liu (2006) shows that model (6) not only explains the TR and 
LM12 premiums, which the FF3FM model does not, but it also accounts for market 
anomalies associated with size, book-to-market, cash-flow-to-price, earnings-to-price, 
dividend yield, and long-term contrarian investment. 
 To explore the source of SEO firms’ negative FF3FM alphas in Table 7 and whether 
liquidity risk can explain SEO performance, as a first step, Table 8 examines whether 
alternative asset pricing models explain the returns to liquidity-sorted portfolios. We classify 
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stocks into LM12 deciles at the end of each year from 1969 to 2008 and calculate 




The first row of Table 8 shows the mean value of LM12 for each portfolio, from the 
lowest liquidity portfolio, LL, to the highest liquidity portfolio, HL. The second row reports 
the proportion of firms within each liquidity decile that make an SEO in the following twelve 
months. This proportion increases almost monotonically from portfolio LL to portfolio HL, 
with the proportion within the two highest liquidity deciles being 9.5%, compared with 0.7% 
for the two lowest liquidity deciles. The fact that this proportion is far from uniform across 
the deciles indicates the potential relevance of liquidity.  
 The next four rows of Table 8 report the alphas and associated p-values from FF3FM 
and LCAPM regressions of the monthly decile portfolio returns. The FF3FM alpha is large 
and negative for the most liquid decile, HL, which contains the highest proportion of SEOs, 
suggesting the reason for the negative SEO FF3FM alphas in Table 7. In contrast, the 
LCAPM alphas are insignificant across all liquidity deciles.  
We also estimate Eckbo and Norli’s (2005) model, minus the momentum factor, and 
report alphas for this model and associated p-values in the last two rows of Table 8.
16
 This 
four factor model eliminates the negative performance of the most liquid decile, HL, but, 
similar to the FF3FM, it underprices the low liquidity deciles LL, L2, and L3.  
The results in Table 8 confirm that the LCAPM can explain cross-sectional variation 
in returns to liquidity-sorted portfolios. In contrast, the FF3FM overprices the most liquid 
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 We discuss the decomposed buy-and-hold returns method of Liu and Strong (2008) in detail in Section 6.2. 
Our conclusions are qualitatively the same using traditional calendar time portfolio analysis. 
16
 To create their liquidity factor, LMH, we follow Eckbo and Norli (2005) and sort all NYSE/AMEX stocks 
into two portfolios based on market value of equity and three portfolios based on stock turnover at each year-
end, and calculate monthly portfolio returns using VW for the next twelve months. LMH is the difference in 
equally weighted returns on the two low turnover portfolios (L) and the two high turnover portfolios (H). 
Portfolios are rebalanced in December each year. Over January 1970–December 2009, LMH has a mean value 





stocks, offering a potential explanation for previous findings of low SEO performance using a 
FF3FM benchmark. The FF3FM augmented by Eckbo and Norli’s (2005) liquidity factor 
fails to price low liquidity portfolios. 
 
5.2 Liquidity risk as an explanation for low SEO performance after the issue and relative to 
size and book-to-market stocks 
To examine whether liquidity risk can explain post-SEO stock price performance, 
Table 9, Panel A reports intercepts and factor loadings of LCAPM calendar time portfolio 
regressions using the same SEO portfolio returns as in Table 7. None of the intercepts is 
distinguishable from zero. The coefficient on LIQ for all issuers is −0.096 using EW and 
−0.066 using VW, with Nasdaq issuers driving these loadings. Given an average monthly 
liquidity premium over 1970–2009 of 0.615%, these liquidity loadings lower the pooled and 
Nasdaq SEO expected returns by −0.059% and −0.126% per month using EW and by 
−0.041% and −0.274% per month using VW. NYSE/AMEX issuers have less liquidity risk 
than the average CRSP stock, which has a loading of 0.299 on LIQ over our sample period, 
1/197012/2009 (results untabulated).  
Table 9, Panel B tests the significance of the differences in SEO factor loadings 
before and after the offering using Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests from seemingly unrelated 
regressions. The LIQ loading before the offering is from LCAPM regressions over five years 
before the issue. The columns headed Difference: after − before gives the difference in factor 
loadings. Post-issue LIQ loadings are significantly lower for all SEO samples except for the 
NYSE/AMEX portfolio using VW. This confirms a reduction in SEO liquidity risk exposure 
after the issue and complements the results on the evolution of liquidity characteristics in 
Figure 1 and Table 3. Differences in SEO market sensitivities are significant for all SEO 




consistent with Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2010), who argue that exercising growth 
options reduces SEO market risk. However, the post-issue market risk reduction is too small 
to fully explain low long-run SEO performance. For example, for the pooled sample using 
EW, lower market risk reduces post-issue monthly expected returns by 0.037% (−0.086 × 
0.429%) compared to a 0.131% reduction attributable to lower liquidity risk. Overall, the 
LCAPM estimates show that lower liquidity risk exposures explain issuers’ post-issue 
performance. 
 A diversification effect in calendar time portfolios may explain the zero LCAPM 
alphas in Table 9. To test if our method of applying the calendar time analysis affects our 
inferences, we estimate the LCAPM for individual SEO stocks. Following Lin and Wu 
(2010) we estimate the following regression model 
,0 ,1 ,0 ,1 ,0 ,1
( )( ) ( )
it ft i i SEO mi mi SEO mt ft li li SEO t it
R R D D R R D LIQ                     (7) 
where the 0 and 1 subscripts indicate estimates for the pre- and post-issue periods, and DSEO 










 . The regression spans the period five years before and after the equity issue 
and we require at least six observations before and after the issue for each SEO to estimate 
the model, which eliminates two SEOs from the sample.
17
  
 Table 10, Panel A shows average estimates for model (7) across 4,444 SEOs. 
Consistent with previous evidence (Bayless and Jay, 2003), we find strong pre-issue SEO 
abnormal performance of 1.657% using EW and 0.850% using VW. But we find no evidence 
of post-issue negative abnormal performance based on the LCAPM, with 
0 1α α  
being 
insignificantly different from zero for SEO portfolios using both EW and VW. Further, LIQ 
factor loadings are lower after the issue, with reductions across all SEOs of −0.287 using EW 
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and −0.068 using VW. The post-issue fall in liquidity risk is higher for Nasdaq than for 
NYSE/AMEX stocks. Controlling for lower liquidity risk, the regression results also show a 
reduction in market risk post-SEO. Our conclusions remain qualitatively the same when we 
adjust p-values for SEO clustering in event time.  
 Table 10, Panel B repeats the regressions using the FF3FM. This model fails to 
explain post-issue SEO returns and produces negative average values for 
0 1α α  for SEO 
portfolios using both EW and VW. Consistent with Table 7, the magnitude of SEO 
underperformance is higher for Nasdaq than for NYSE/AMEX listed equity issuers (−0.224% 
vs. −0.102% using EW and −0.220% vs. −0.091% using VW). Table 10, Panel C summarizes 
the results on SEO abnormal performance and risk changes from Panels A and B and 
provides further details of their cross-section distribution. Overall, the results in Table 10 
reinforce the liquidity risk explanation of the low SEO return performance after the offering. 
 Finally, we examine whether size–B/M matching captures the liquidity features of 
SEOs. We calculate returns for a zero-investment portfolio long in issuers and short in 
benchmark stocks, and regress these on the LCAPM. Untabulated results show that the zero-
investment portfolio has a significantly negative LIQ loading for all portfolios using EW and 
for the portfolio of Nasdaq issuers using VW. Further, the liquidity risk mismatch is higher 
for Nasdaq than for NYSE/AMEX listed SEOs. This evidence indicates that two-dimensional 
matching on size–B/M does not guarantee that the benchmark’s risk sensitivity captures the 
covariance structure of SEO returns. Stocks with large differences in liquidity characteristics 
also tend to have large differences in LIQ sensitivities. 
 In summary, SEOs improve their liquidity following the offering, which reduces their 
exposure to liquidity risk and explains their post-offering performance. Size–B/M matching 




leading to benchmark bias. As buy-and-hold returns compound any risk mismatch over the 
holding period, it is easy to misinterpret the bias as SEO underperformance.  
  
6. Robustness tests 
 Particular research design choices may drive our previous results. Averaging SEO 
returns across samples can dilute the underperformance effect if it is confined to a particular 
stock grouping. Monthly rebalancing of calendar time portfolios involves excessive 
transaction costs and does not correspond to an investor’s experience when investing in event 
firms. Finally, our results could be due to our particular choice of liquidity augmented asset 
pricing model. To address these concerns, we run several robustness tests.    
 
6.1 SEO long-run performance: subsample results 
 Table 11, Panels A–C analyse the performance of SEOs across several sub-portfolios: 
three industry groups, two types of equity issued (primary shares and combinations of 
secondary and equity sale by a major shareholder), and nine Fama and French size and B/M 
portfolios. Panel C examines hot vs. cold periods, as Loughran and Ritter (2000) report 
greater SEO underperformance during hot issue periods, and interpret this as evidence of 
time-varying misvaluation. Panel D examines SEOs within and outside a five-year period 
after an IPO in order to gauge the sensitivity of our results to low post-IPO performance. 
Panel E investigates 12- 24-, 36-, and 48-month holding periods to verify that abnormal 
performance is not confined to a shorter horizon, while Panel F examines equity issues during 
1970–2001 and 2002–2004 to test if poor stock return performance during the financial crisis 
2007–2009 affects our results. Table 11 shows that regression alphas are insignificant in 





 Table 11, Panel H shows LCAPM estimates for SEO portfolios formed three and six 
months after the issue. This serves to distinguish between short- and long-term SEO liquidity 
improvements after the offering. For example, (short-term) underwriter price-stabilization 
activity after the issue may temporarily increase SEO stock liquidity, but the increased stock 
liquidity may disappear once price support is withdrawn (Benveniste et al., 1996, 1998).
18
 
We find that SEO portfolios formed three and six months after the offering load negatively 
on the LIQ factor, which suggests that post-SEO liquidity gains extend beyond the immediate 
period after the SEO.  
 
6.2  Decomposed buy-and-hold returns 
 Liu and Strong (2008) criticize portfolios formed with the frequent rebalancing 
implicit in standard calendar time portfolios and point out that monthly rebalancing is 
inconsistent with a multi-month holding period strategy and involves prohibitive transaction 
costs. We apply their technique to decompose long-term SEO portfolio buy-and-hold returns 
to a monthly frequency.
19
 This method transfers the integrity of a buy-and-hold investment 
strategy to calendar time and directly adjusts for cross-sectional correlation. An investor 
incurs transaction costs only twice, at the beginning and end of the five-year holding period, 
compared with the monthly transaction costs implicit in the standard calendar time approach.  
We apply the decomposed buy-and-hold return approach as follows. Every six months 
we form a portfolio of all stocks issuing equity in the previous six months and calculate 
BHRs for this portfolio over the five-year event window as the weighted sum of individual 
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 Previous studies show that stock flipping (selling allocated shares shortly after an IPO) explains a substantial 
proportion of share trading after the issue. Using sales of 10,000 shares or more to approximate seller-initiated 
block trades, Krigman et al. (1999) find that flipping explains 45% of trading volume on the first post-IPO 
trading day for cold issues and 22% for hot issues. Using detailed data on stock flipping around IPOs, Aggarwal 
(2003) reports that 19% of trading volume within two days of the IPO is due to stock flipping, with institutional 
investors flipping more than retail customers. However, Chemmanur et al. (2009) find that institutional investors 
sell only 3.2% of the SEO stock allocated to them in the first two days after the issue and conclude that stock 
flipping is rare after SEOs.  
19





BHRs. We obtain decomposed buy-and-hold monthly portfolio returns using equation (3) of 



































for 2,  ...,  t m     (8) 
where 
ptR  is the month t return on a portfolio of n
 
stocks with monthly returns on individual 
stocks of 
iR ,  m is the number of holding period months, and ix  is stock i’s portfolio weight. 






 . This approach imposes no portfolio rebalancing over the five-year 







  , where tw
 
denotes either EW or VW (see Figure 3). EW uses the 
inverse of the number of decomposed BHR portfolios. VW uses portfolio market values at 
the start of the holding period. With a five-year holding period there is a minimum of one and 
maximum of ten overlapping portfolios.  
 Liu and Strong (2008) show that negative serial correlation in individual stock returns 
leads to higher returns, while positive autocovariances in portfolio returns lead to lower 
returns on rebalanced portfolios compared with the decomposed portfolio. They report a 
positive bias for small, low-price and loser stocks and a negative bias for large and high-price 
stocks. Our SEO portfolios comprise a mix of both stock types and there is no statistical 
difference between average monthly returns of both series.  
 Table 12 reports results using decomposed portfolio BHRs in LCAPM calendar time 
regressions. For comparison, we report results from a standard calendar time approach. None 
of the alphas indicate SEO underperformance. The decomposed buy-and-hold approach does 




is not surprising as SEOs include liquid stocks from all size-based portfolios and are less 
likely to suffer from the microstructure biases that the decomposed method adjusts for.  
 
6.3 Alternative specifications of the liquidity factor 
 Finally, we test the robustness of our results on the lower post-issue SEO liquidity 
risk exposure to alternative specifications of the liquidity factor. We use the FF3FM 
augmented by Eckbo and Norli’s (2005) LMH factor, and by the residuals (LIQ_res) from 
regressing LIQ on SMB and HML (without a constant) to test if LIQ captures a liquidity effect 
controlling for size and book-to-market effects. Table 13 shows that LMH and LIQ_res are 
significant, controlling for the Fama–French factors. The significant loading on LIQ_res 
indicates the incremental power of liquidity risk over the Fama–French size and B/M factors 
to explain the cross-section of returns.
20, 21
   
 
7. Conclusions 
 Using four measures that each emphasize a different dimension of liquidity, we find 
that SEO firms are significantly more liquid after the issue and relative to size–B/M matched 
stocks. Examining the potential causes of post-issue liquidity changes, we show that SEO 
firms experience an increase in analyst following and in institutional holdings of their stock 
over the five years after the issue compared with the five years pre-issue. Higher analyst 
following improves the amount and quality of information about the firm, which lowers 
adverse selection costs of trading and improves stock liquidity. Increased trading by 
institutional investors reduces the adverse selection costs of trading with a better informed 
party, further explaining SEO liquidity gains after the issue.  
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 We also regress SEO EW and VW pooled portfolio returns on the FF3FM augmented by Pastor and 
Stambaugh’s (2003) traded liquidity factor (PS_VW). Untabulated results show significant PS_VW loadings for 
the VW portfolio only.  
21
 As LIQ_res is a non-traded factor, the intercepts from LIQ_res augmented FF3FM regressions do not have the 





 Estimates from pricing models show that SEOs bear less liquidity risk after the 
offering and that size-B/M benchmarks are unable to capture the dynamics of SEO firms’ 
liquidity risk. In contrast, the liquidity augmented CAPM captures the performance of SEOs. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of four liquidity measures for a sample of SEOs and their size–B/M matched control stocks.  
Figure 1a shows the average cost of share trading, c (
210 ). Figure 1b shows the average daily turnover rate, TR (in %). Figure 1c shows the average liquidity measure of Liu 
(2006), LM12. Figure 1d shows Amihud’s (2002) return to volume measure, RtoV (
610 ). The effective cost of trading, c, is Hasbrouck’s (2009) annual Gibbs estimate of 
transactions cost. TR is the daily number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding on the day averaged over the prior 12 months. RtoV is the absolute 
daily return divided by the dollar denominated trading volume on the day averaged over the prior 12 months. The figures report the end of month liquidity characteristics for 
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Figure 2. Evolution of analyst coverage and institutional shareholding for a sample of SEOs 
and their size–B/M matched control stocks.  
Figure 2a shows the average number of analysts following a firm, #Anal. Figure 2b shows the average number 
of institutional investors holding SEO stock, #Inst. Figure 2c shows the average proportion of common shares 
held by institutional investors, %SharesInst. The figures report the end of month characteristics for a sample of 
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Figure 2c. Average proportion of shares held by institutional 
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Figure 3. Schematic for the construction of decomposed BHR portfolio returns in calendar 
time.  




R , for this portfolio over the 5-year event window as the weighted sum of individual BHRs 
and decompose portfolio BHRs into monthly portfolio returns (Liu and Strong 2008). The grand calendar time 






   where tw
 
denotes equal weighting (EW) or value weighting (VW). EW uses 
the inverse of the number of decomposed BHR portfolios in month t. VW uses market capitalization at portfolio 









Table 1. SEO sample distribution, 1970–2004.  
The table describes the distribution of SEOs for the pooled sample and NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks over 
1970–2004, stratified by financial (Financial), industrial (Industrial), and utility (Utility) firms, type of offering 
(Primary for secondary offerings of primary shares and Combination for a mix of primary and major 
shareholder equity sale), nine Fama and French size (Small, S, Medium, Me, Big, B) and book-to-market (High, 
H, Medium, M, Low, L) portfolios, the offering decade (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s), and the offering period 
(Hot for months where the number of SEOs in the month before the issue exceeds the median over the previous 
12 months, Cold for other months). 
 
 Pooled sample NYSE/AMEX Nasdaq 
Total 4446 1995 2451 
Financial 517 242 275 
Industrial 3447 1339 2108 
Utility 482 414 68 
Combination 1481 409 1072 
Primary 2965 1586 1379 
FF S–L 1204 198 1006 
FF S–M 694 218 476 
FF S–H 535 205 330 
FF Me–L 585 250 335 
FF Me–M 487 325 162 
FF Me–H 276 197 79 
FF B–L 222 181 41 
FF B–M 265 252 13 
FF B–H 178 169 9 
1970s 566 439 127 
1980s 1343 626 717 
1990s 1809 646 1163 
2000s 728 284 444 
Hot 3042 1341 1701 






Table 2. The long-run performance of SEOs.  
The table reports the average percentage five-year BHRs of equity issuers (Issuer) and control firms (Match) matched on size and book-to-market for a sample of 4,446 SEOs 
using equal weighting (EW) and value weighting (VW). Diff is the difference between these figures, t a two-sided skewness-adjusted t-statistic testing the hypothesis of no 
difference between the average long-run performance of issuers and matches, and p its p-value. t-JK is the (skewness-adjusted) test statistic for Jegadeesh and Karceski’s 
(2009) heteroskedasticity and correlation consistent t-test, with p-JK its corresponding p-value. N is the number of offerings. Value weights standardize market capitalization 
by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index to ensure comparability over time. 
 
Weight Portfolio N Issuer (%) Match (%) Diff (%) t P t-JK  p-JK 
EW 
All exchanges 4446 
46.12% 73.79% −27.67% −8.345 0.000 −1.801 0.072 
VW 55.87% 81.97% −26.10% −15.026 0.000 −1.947 0.052 
EW 
NYSE/AMEX 1995 
62.22% 85.65% −23.43% −5.209 0.000 −1.773 0.076 
VW 57.43% 83.66% −26.23% −9.031 0.000 −1.828 0.068 
EW 
Nasdaq 2451 
33.02% 64.14% −31.12% −6.170 0.000 −1.696 0.090 






Table 3. Liquidity characteristics of SEOs and their matches before and after the issue. 
The table reports the average effective cost of trading, c (
210 ), Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure, LM12, daily 
share turnover rate, TR, and Amihud’s (2002) return to volume measure, RtoV (
610 ). The effective cost of 
trading, c, is Hasbrouck’s (2009) annual Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs. TR is the daily number of 
shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding on the day averaged over the prior 12 months, as a 
percentage. RtoV is the absolute daily return divided by the dollar denominated trading volume on the day 
averaged over the prior 12 months. The table gives the liquidity characteristics of SEOs (Issuer) and their size–
B/M benchmarks (Match). Diff is the mean difference between these values and p the corresponding p-value. N 
is the number of observations. Panel A shows results for the 5-year period before the offering, Panel B for the 5-
year post-offering period.  
 
  Portfolio N Issuer  Match  Diff p 
Panel A. 5-year liquidity characteristics before the offering       
c 
All exchanges 3587 
0.962 0.898 0.065 0.000 
LM12 7.075 8.487 −1.413 0.000 
TR (%) 0.374 0.345 0.029 0.000 
RtoV 1.857 1.391 0.465 0.000 
c 
NYSE/AMEX 1869 
0.590 0.631 −0.041 0.000 
LM12 3.771 5.063 −1.291 0.000 
TR (%) 0.245 0.289 −0.043 0.000 
RtoV 0.962 0.643 0.319 0.000 
c 
Nasdaq 1718 
1.595 1.351 0.244 0.000 
LM12 12.690 14.309 −1.619 0.000 
TR (%) 0.592 0.441 0.151 0.000 
RtoV 3.378 2.663 0.715 0.000 
Panel B. 5-year liquidity characteristics after the offering 
   
c 
All exchanges 3587 
0.736 0.927 −0.191 0.000 
LM12 2.228 7.881 −5.653 0.000 
TR (%) 0.636 0.455 0.182 0.000 
RtoV 0.821 1.974 −1.153 0.000 
c 
NYSE/AMEX 1869 
0.517 0.672 −0.156 0.000 
LM12 1.514 5.239 −3.725 0.000 
TR (%) 0.383 0.362 0.020 0.000 
RtoV 0.619 0.975 −0.356 0.000 
c 
Nasdaq 1718 
0.984 1.215 −0.231 0.000 
LM12 3.034 10.864 −7.830 0.000 
TR (%) 0.923 0.559 0.364 0.000 




Table 4. The long-run performance of SEOs: liquidity matching. 
The table reports the average five-year BHRs of equity issuers (Issuer) and control firms (Match) matched on size and book-to-market (size–B/M matching) and post-issue 
LM12 (LM12 matching) using equal weighting (EW) and value weighting (VW). Diff is the difference between these figures. Holding period shows the holding period start 
and end month. t is a two-sided skewness-adjusted t-statistic testing the hypothesis of no difference between the average long-run performance of issuers and their matches, p 
its p-value, t-JK the (skewness-adjusted) test statistic for Jegadeesh and Karceski’s (2009) heteroskedasticity and correlation consistent t-test, with p-JK its corresponding p-
value. N is the number of offerings. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index to give comparability over time. 
 




38.40% 74.14% −35.75% −10.598 0.000 −1.959 0.050 
VW 43.89% 66.24% −22.35% −12.874 0.000 −2.425 0.015 
EW 
LM12 matching 
38.40% 56.37% −17.97% −5.469 0.000 −1.334 0.182 




38.47% 66.77% −28.30% −8.701 0.000 −1.957 0.050 
VW 40.45% 58.14% −17.70% −10.731 0.000 −2.301 0.021 
EW 
LM12 matching 
38.47% 51.71% −13.25% −4.040 0.000 −1.231 0.218 




36.92% 56.19% −19.26% −6.288 0.000 −1.988 0.047 
VW 40.60% 51.23% −10.63% −6.408 0.000 −1.621 0.105 
EW 
LM12 matching 
36.92% 45.17% −8.25% −2.794 0.025 −1.308 0.191 







Table 5. Analyst coverage and institutional holdings of SEOs and their matches before and 
after the issue. 
The table reports the mean analyst following and institutional investor stockholdings of SEOs (Issuer) and their 
size–B/M benchmarks (Match) over 1985–2009. #Anal is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts 
for a firm, over all possible forecast horizons, in the past 12 months including the current month. #Inst is the 
total number of institutions holding stock in a firm. %SharesInst is the percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors. Diff is the mean difference between these values and p the corresponding p-value. N is the number of 
observations. Panel A shows the results for the 5-year period before the offering, Panel B for the 5-year post-
offering period.  
 
  Portfolio N Issuer  Match  Diff p 
Panel A. 5-year analyst coverage and institutional investor holdings before the offering 
#Anal 
All exchanges 2172 
 
8.288 7.946 0.342 0.000 
%SharesInst 42.12% 41.50% 0.62% 0.000 
#Inst 79.402 83.931 −4.529 0.000 
#Anal 
NYSE/AMEX 848 
11.941 11.350 0.591 0.000 
%SharesInst 49.23% 48.02% 1.21% 0.000 
#Inst 123.814 127.215 −3.401 0.000 
#Anal 
Nasdaq 1324 
5.017 4.899 0.119 0.000 
%SharesInst 35.75% 35.66% 0.09% 0.635 
#Inst 39.645 45.184 −5.539 0.000 
Panel B. 5-year analyst coverage and institutional investor holdings after the offering 
#Anal 
All exchanges 2172 
10.117 7.473 2.644 0.000 
%SharesInst 55.17% 47.43% 7.74% 0.000 
#Inst 110.048 94.737 15.311 0.000 
#Anal 
NYSE/AMEX 848 
13.103 10.387 2.715 0.000 
%SharesInst 60.50% 54.32% 6.19% 0.000 
#Inst 166.004 144.457 21.547 0.000 
#Anal 
Nasdaq 1324 
8.076 5.481 2.595 0.000 
%SharesInst 51.52% 42.72% 8.80% 0.000 








Table 6. Regression analysis of post-issue SEO liquidity gains. 
The table reports estimates (Estimate) from regressions of post-issue SEO liquidity gains, measured as the 
change in each of four liquidity characteristics in the 5-year post- vs. pre-issue period. The liquidity 
characteristics are the effective cost of trading (c), share turnover (TR), which is the daily number of shares 
traded divided by the number of shares outstanding on the day averaged over the prior 12 months, Liu’s (2006) 
liquidity measure (LM12), and return-to-volume (RtoV), which is the absolute daily return divided by the dollar 
denominated trading volume on the day averaged over the prior 12 months. ∆#Anal is the change in the number 
of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a firm in the 5-year post- vs. pre-issue period. ∆#Inst is the change 
in the total number of institutions holding stock in a firm in the 5-year post- vs. pre-issue period. ∆%SharesInst 
is the change in the proportion of stock held by institutional investors in the 5-year post- vs. pre-issue period. 
%NewShares is the proportion of (primary and secondary) shares issued by the firm relative to the total number 
of shares outstanding one month before the offering. B/M is the book-to-market ratio and MV is market 
capitalization. Hot and Nasdaq are indicator variables for hot-issue periods and for an SEO listing on Nasdaq. 
All variables are measured over 1985–2009. N is the number of observations, p the associated p-value, and Adj 
R
2
 is the adjusted R-squared. 
 
 
           −c TR −LM12 −RtoV 
  Estimate P Estimate p Estimate  p Estimate p 
Intercept 6.405 0.000 0.081 0.191 17.168 0.000 2.648 0.000 
∆#Anal 0.202 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.172 0.043 0.063 0.002 
∆%SharesInst  7.789 0.000 0.611 0.000 0.263 0.893 1.029 0.027 
∆#Inst  −0.005 0.258 0.001 0.000 −0.006 0.491 −0.002 0.361 
%NewShares  2.258 0.027 0.066 0.314 8.389 0.000 2.091 0.000 
B/M  0.502 0.045 −0.044 0.007 3.110 0.000 0.395 0.003 
ln MV −1.123 0.000 −0.008 0.433 −2.971 0.000 −0.493 0.000 
Hot −0.159 0.584 0.019 0.303 −1.098 0.089 −0.141 0.358 
Nasdaq 2.304 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.663 0.361 −0.048 0.782 
N 2172  2172  2172  2172  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Adj. R
2





Table 7. Calendar time regressions of SEO returns on the Fama–French three-factors. 
The table reports estimates (Estimate) from calendar time regressions of SEO returns on the Fama and French 
(1993) three factors from April 1970 to December 2009. MKT is the market excess return, SMB is the average 
return on a portfolio long in small (S) and short in big (B) stocks controlling for book-to-market. HML is the 
average return on a portfolio long in high (H) and short in low (L) book-to-market stocks controlling for size. T 
is the length of the time series in months, p denotes p-values, and Adj R
2
 is the adjusted R-squared. EW denotes 
equal weighting and VW value weighting. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the value-
weighted CRSP stock market index to give comparability over time. 
 
      EW VW 
Portfolio T Parameter Estimate p Adj. R
2
 Estimate p Adj. R
2
 
All exchanges 477 
 −0.246% 0.007 0.912 −0.344% 0.001 0.847 
MKT 1.126 0.000  1.128 0.000  
SMB 0.736 0.000  0.097 0.003  
HML 0.129 0.000  0.347 0.000  
NYSE/AMEX 476 
 −0.297% 0.001 0.882 −0.399% 0.000 0.832 
MKT 1.102 0.000  1.106 0.000  
SMB 0.470 0.000  −0.024 0.538  
HML 0.441 0.000  0.490 0.000  
Nasdaq 412 
 −0.312% 0.010 0.896 −0.305% 0.072 0.814 
MKT 1.206 0.000  1.311 0.000  
SMB 0.965 0.000  0.656 0.000  




Table 8. Regressing liquidity portfolio returns on alternative asset pricing models.  
The table reports intercepts from calendar time regressions of equally weighted returns to ten liquidity portfolios on Liu’s (2006) LCAPM (LCAPM ), the Fama and French 
(1993) model (FF3FM ), and the FF3FM with an LMH liquidity factor (FF3FM+LMH α) from January 1970 to December 2009. The liquidity deciles are sorted from 
lowest (LL) to highest (HL) liquidity. Specifically, at year-end, we sort all CRSP stocks into deciles on LM12 and calculate equally weighted portfolio returns for the next 
twelve months using Liu and Strong’s (2008) decomposed buy-and-hold returns method. Portfolio returns are adjusted for delisting returns. The liquidity factor in Liu (2006) 
is the difference in average returns between portfolios of low and high liquidity stocks based on LM12. LMH is the turnover-based liquidity factor of Eckbo and Norli (2005) 
and is the average return difference between a portfolio long in low turnover stocks and short in high turnover stocks controlling for firm size. Size quintiles are from smallest 
(Small) to biggest (Big) capitalization stocks and book-to-market quintiles are ordered from low (Low B/M) to high (High B/M). Mean LM12 is the mean value of LM12 for 
the portfolio. SEOs as % of portfolio is the percentage of portfolio constituents that make an SEO in the following twelve months. p denotes p-values.  
 
 
  LL L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 HL 
Mean LM12 111.774 47.590 21.552 9.242 3.475 0.974 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SEOs as % of portfolio 0.20% 0.52% 0.88% 1.61% 2.39% 2.58% 2.48% 2.85% 3.90% 5.57% 
LCAPM α 0.038% 0.059% 0.049% 0.020% −0.091% −0.002% 0.158% 0.183% 0.107% −0.110% 
p 0.797 0.724 0.782 0.903 0.503 0.990 0.158 0.262 0.602 0.629 
FF3FM α 0.416% 0.322% 0.236% 0.085% −0.121% −0.110% 0.015% −0.011% −0.143% −0.479% 
p 0.003 0.010 0.044 0.383 0.228 0.196 0.836 0.901 0.211 0.000 
FF3FM+LMH α 0.372% 0.343% 0.224% 0.073% −0.165% −0.094% 0.095% 0.126% 0.090% −0.101% 




Table 9. Liquidity risk and the long-run performance of SEOs: calendar time analysis.  
Panel A reports coefficients (Estimate) from calendar time LCAPM regressions for SEOs for five years after the issue. MKT is the market excess return; LIQ is the difference 
in average returns between portfolios of low and high liquidity stocks based on LM12. p denotes p-values, Adj.R
2
 is the adjusted R-squared, and T is the length of the time 
series in months. Panel B tests the hypothesis of coefficient equality in LCAPM regressions for SEOs five years before and after the issue from seemingly unrelated 
regressions using a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test with a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Factor loadings before the issue are from calendar time LCAPM 
regressions for SEOs for five years before the issue. Difference: after − before is the difference in factor loadings after compared to before the issue. EW stands for equal 
weighting and VW for value weighting. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index to give comparability over time.  
 
   EW VW 
Portfolio T Parameter Estimate p Adj. R
2
 Estimate p Adj. R
2
 
Panel A. Regression of SEO portfolios on the LCAPM  
All exchanges 477 
 −0.030% 0.834 0.794 −0.098% 0.388 0.816 
MKT 1.195 0.000  1.035 0.000  
LIQ −0.096 0.043  −0.066 0.080  
NYSE/AMEX 476 
 −0.099% 0.435 0.791 −0.209% 0.143 0.816 
MKT 1.139 0.000  1.029 0.000  
LIQ 0.085 0.044  0.076 0.207  
Nasdaq 412 
 0.001% 0.998 0.735 0.144% 0.527 0.762 
MKT 1.271 0.000  1.203 0.000  
LIQ −0.204 0.023   −0.446 0.000   
 
  EW VW 
Portfolio Test Difference: after − before LM p Difference: after − before LM p 
Panel B. Testing the hypothesis of coefficient equality between SEO portfolios created before and after the offering regressed on the LCAPM 
All exchanges 
MKT (before the offering) = MKT (after the offering) −0.086 16.090 0.000 −0.025 0.900 0.344 
LIQ   (before the offering) = LIQ  (after the offering) −0.212 65.060 0.000 −0.100 9.200 0.002 
NYSE/AMEX 
MKT (before the offering) = MKT (after the offering) −0.063 6.590 0.010 −0.011 0.140 0.705 
LIQ   (before the offering) = LIQ  (after the offering) −0.181 35.810 0.000 −0.065 3.530 0.060 
Nasdaq 
MKT (before the offering) = MKT (after the offering) −0.084 5.790 0.016 −0.117 3.560 0.059 




Table 10. Liquidity risk and the long-run performance of SEOs: firm-specific regressions  
Panel A reports average parameter estimates (Estimate) from individual SEO regressions for five years before 
and after the issue. The regression model takes the form  
,0 ,1 ,0 ,1 ,0 ,1
( )( ) ( )
it ft i i SEO mi mi SEO mt ft li li SEO itt
R R D D R R D LIQ                  , 
where the 0 and 1 subscripts indicate estimates for the pre- and post-issue periods and DSEO is an indicator 
variable for the post-issue period. MKT is the market excess return and LIQ is the difference in average returns 
between portfolios of low and high liquidity stocks based on LM12. p denotes average p-values, Adj.R
2
 is the 
average adjusted R-squared, and N is the number of SEOs. Panel B repeats the analysis for the FF3FM (Fama 
and French 1993). Panel C presents the cross-section distribution of post-issue SEO abnormal performance, 
0 1α α , and changes in risk exposure from the liquidity augmented CAPM (LCAPM) and FF3FM regressions. 
EW denotes equal weighting and VW value weighting. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the 
value-weighted CRSP stock market index to ensure comparability over time. Mean and Median stand for mean 
and median values, SE denotes the standard error, Q1 and Q3 stand for the upper and the lower quartile. 
         
      EW     VW     
Portfolio N Parameter Estimate p Adj. R
2
 Estimate p Adj. R
2
 
Panel A. Regression of individual SEO returns on the liquidity augmented CAPM     
All exchanges 4444 
0α  1.657% 0.000 0.225 0.850% 0.000 0.321 
1α  −1.629% 0.000  
−0.844% 0.000 
 
0 1α α  0.027% 0.588  
0.006% 0.830 
 




MKT×DSEO −0.190 0.000  
−0.069 0.000 
 








0α  0.874% 0.000 0.254 0.559% 0.000 0.328 
1α  −0.840% 0.000  
−0.570% 0.000 
 
0 1α α  0.034% 0.498  
−0.011% 0.697 
 




MKT×DSEO −0.128 0.000  
−0.048 0.001 
 








0α  2.294% 0.000 0.201 2.897% 0.000 0.271 
1α  −2.272% 0.000  
−2.770% 0.000 
 
0 1α α  0.022% 0.791  
0.127% 0.129 
 




MKT×DSEO −0.241 0.000  
−0.217 0.000 
 




LIQ×DSEO −0.329 0.000  
−0.170 0.000 
 




Table 10, cont. 
 
      EW     VW     
Portfolio N Parameter Estimate p Adj. R
2
 Estimate p Adj. R
2
 
Panel B. Regression of individual SEO returns on the FF3FM  
All exchanges 4444 
0α  1.531% 0.000 0.287 0.713% 0.000 0.385 
1α  −1.700% 0.000  
−0.820% 0.000 
 
0 1α α  −0.169% 0.000  
−0.107% 0.000 
 




MKT×DSEO −0.007 0.718  
−0.026 0.015 
 




SMB×DSEO −0.151 0.000  
−0.064 0.000 
 








0α  0.768% 0.000 0.319 0.452% 0.000 0.393 
1α  −0.870% 0.000  
−0.543% 0.000 
 
0 1α α  −0.102% 0.034  
−0.091% 0.000 
 




MKT×DSEO 0.013 0.477  
−0.022 0.068 
 




SMB×DSEO −0.109 0.000  
−0.042 0.015 
 











0α  2.152% 0.000 0.261 2.548% 0.000 0.326 
1α  −2.376% 0.000  
−2.767% 0.000 
 
0 1α α  −0.224% 0.002  
−0.220% 0.006 
 




MKT×DSEO −0.024 0.473  
−0.052 0.068 
 




SMB×DSEO −0.185 0.000  
−0.216 0.000 
 




HML×DSEO 0.032 0.540   0.101 0.018   
Model Weight N Mean SE Median Q1 Q3 
Panel C. The cross-section distribution of post-issue SEO abnormal performance,
0 1α α  , and risk changes 
LCAPM 
EW 
0 1α α  0.027% 0.001 0.091% −1.105% 1.286% 
MKT×DSEO −0.190 0.026 −0.127 −0.822 0.463 
LIQ×DSEO −0.287 0.030 −0.184 −1.107 0.565 
VW 
0 1α α  0.006% 0.000 −0.034% −0.602% 0.502% 
MKT×DSEO −0.069 0.012 −0.061 −0.358 0.309 
LIQ×DSEO −0.068 0.015 −0.084 −0.447 0.494 
FF3FM  
EW 
0 1α α  −0.169% 0.000 −0.060% −1.133% 0.992% 
MKT×DSEO −0.007 0.021 0.014 −0.505 0.525 
SMB×DSEO −0.151 0.029 −0.115 −0.889 0.592 
HML×DSEO 0.032 0.032 0.016 −0.821 0.885 
VW 
0 1α α  −0.107% 0.000 −0.142% −0.570% 0.392% 
MKT×DSEO −0.026 0.011 −0.026 −0.394 0.316 
SMB×DSEO −0.064 0.015 −0.006 −0.500 0.353 





Table 11. Calendar time robustness checks: subsample analysis.  
The table reports coefficients (Estimate) from calendar time LCAPM regressions for subsamples of SEOs. T is 
the length of the portfolio time series, p denotes p-values, and Adj. R
2
 the adjusted R-squared. Panel A classifies 
issuers according to industry group: Industry, Finance and Utility. Panel B shows the distribution of SEOs 
across equity issue type: Combination and Primary. Panel C stratifies issuers across nine Fama and French 
portfolios formed on size (Small, S, Medium, Me, Big, B) and book-to-market (High, H, Medium, M, Low, L). 
Panel D groups issues in Hot and Cold periods (Hot for months where the number of SEOs in the month before 
the issue exceeds the median over the previous 12 months, Cold for other months). Panel E groups issues 
occurring within five years of the IPO date (Age < 5 years) and five years after the IPO (Age  5 years). Panel F 
shows results for event horizons of 12, 24, 36, and 48 months. Panel G groups equity issues over 1970–2001 
and 2002–2004. Panel H shows LCAPM estimates for SEO portfolios formed three and six months after the 
issue. EW denotes equal weighting and VW value weighting. Value weights standardize market capitalization 
by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index to give comparability over time. 
 
      EW     VW     
Group T Parameter Estimate p Adj. R
2
 Estimate P Adj. R
2
 
Panel A. Industry classification of SEOs 
     
Industry 475  −0.063% 0.722 0.766 −0.037% 0.770 0.837 
Finance 373  −0.334% 0.102 0.654 −0.354% 0.236 0.552 
Utility 466  0.183% 0.248 0.466 0.082% 0.650 0.365 
Panel B. Type of equity offering. 
      
Combination 465  −0.146% 0.439 0.748 −0.114% 0.473 0.803 
Primary 476  0.051% 0.717 0.776 −0.097% 0.417 0.790 
Panel C. Fama and French size and book-to-market portfolios. 
   
FF S–L 457  −0.143% 0.588 0.638 −0.017% 0.950 0.648 
FF S–M 458  −0.153% 0.486 0.669 −0.080% 0.718 0.688 
FF S–H 436  0.050% 0.818 0.607 0.148% 0.498 0.630 
FF Me–L 452  0.061% 0.728 0.766 0.034% 0.854 0.755 
FF Me–M 457  0.042% 0.781 0.737 −0.083% 0.623 0.692 
FF Me–H 382  −0.009% 0.960 0.723 −0.079% 0.692 0.701 
FF B–L 433  0.097% 0.474 0.823 0.021% 0.873 0.793 
FF B–M 445  0.004% 0.983 0.645 −0.049% 0.780 0.617 
FF B–H 378  −0.099% 0.635 0.525 −0.119% 0.584 0.406 
Panel D. Hot vs cold issuing period 
      
Hot 477  −0.046% 0.773 0.766 −0.065% 0.586 0.807 
Cold 464  −0.016% 0.913 0.776 −0.147% 0.369 0.716 
Panel E. Age of the issuer 
       
Age < 5 years 463  −0.093% 0.637 0.747 0.113% 0.605 0.747 
Age  5 years 477  −0.008% 0.952 0.803 −0.110% 0.353 0.787 
Panel F. 12-, 24-, 36-, and 42-month holding period 
    
12 months 430  0.169% 0.348 0.777 0.116% 0.321 0.828 
24 months 442  −0.085% 0.579 0.801 −0.110% 0.279 0.853 
36 months 454  −0.112% 0.438 0.803 −0.095% 0.312 0.863 
48 months 466  −0.092% 0.527 0.802 −0.058% 0.636 0.833 
Panel G. SEOs issued over 1970–2001 and 2002–2004 
    
SEOs 2002–2004 94  0.097% 0.775 0.809 −0.297% 0.449 0.745 
SEOs 1970–2001 441  −0.025% 0.872 0.786 −0.036% 0.704 0.854 
Panel H. SEO portfolios formed three and six months after the issue 
   
3-months 475 
 −0.086% 0.550 0.787 −0.115% 0.326 0.808 









 −0.085% 0.562 0.779 −0.118% 0.329 0.794 








Table 12. Decomposed buy-and-hold returns. 
The table reports the intercepts () for a sample of SEOs from calendar time regressions on the LCAPM using 
rebalanced portfolio returns (Reb) and decomposed buy-and-hold returns (DBHR). The sample period is July 
1970–December 2009. T is the length of the portfolio time series in months, p denotes p-values, and Adj. R2 is 
the adjusted R-squared. The table reports results for the pooled sample and for issuers stratified according to the 
exchange where the firm lists. EW denotes equal weighting and VW value weighting. Value weights standardize 
market capitalization by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index to give comparability over time. 
 
      EW VW 
Portfolio Method T  p Adj. R
2






−0.062% 0.664 0.789 −0.126% 0.278 0.805 




−0.105% 0.403 0.787 −0.187% 0.144 0.747 




−0.049% 0.814 0.730 0.020% 0.928 0.763 




















Table 13. FF3FM with alternative liquidity factors. 
The table reports coefficients (Estimate) from calendar time regressions for SEOs for five years after the issue 
on the FF3FM with alternative liquidity factors. The sample period is April 1970–December 2009. MKT is the 
market excess return, SMB is the difference in average returns on a portfolio of small (S) and big (B) stocks 
controlling for book-to-market. HML is the average return difference between a portfolio long in high (H) and 
short in low (L) book-to-market stocks controlling for size. LMH is the turnover-based liquidity factor of Eckbo 
and Norli (2005) and is the average return difference between a portfolio long in low turnover stocks (L) and 
short in high (H) turnover stocks controlling for firm size. LIQ_res are the residuals from regressing Liu’s 
(2006) liquidity factor, LIQ, on SMB and HML without a constant. LIQ is the difference in average returns 
between portfolios of low and high liquidity stocks based on LM12. EW denotes equal weighting and VW value 
weighting. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index to 
give comparability over time. T is the length of the time series in months, p denotes p-values, and Adj.R
2
 is the 








  Factor base T Parameter Estimate p Adj. R
2
 Estimate p Adj. R
2
 
TR 477  −0.078% 0.371 0.924 −0.225% 0.027 0.855 
  



















LIQ 477  −0.140% 0.123 0.917 −0.186% 0.107 0.862 
  
















LIQ_res −0.177 0.000   −0.265 0.000   
 
 
 
 
